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Abstract
Der Bei trag unter sucht  die Rol le
von exter nem  Druck  in  der Wel le
der soge nann ten „far bi gen Revo -
lu tio nen“.  Durch  die Ana ly se
drei er kon kre ter Fall bei spie le –
der Rosen re vo lu ti on  in Geor gi en
(2003),  der oran ge nen Revo lu ti -
on  in  der Ukrai ne (2004)  und  der
Tul pen re vo lu ti on  in Kir gi sis tan
(2005) – ver su chen  wir  die Wir -
kungs be din gun gen,  aber  auch  die
Beschrän kun gen, auf zu zei gen,
de nen exter ne Akteu re,  vor  allem
die  USA  und Russ land, inner halb
der Bewe gun gen unter la gen,  die
die Mas sen mobi li sier ten –  was
schließ lich  zum  Sturz  der nicht-
de mo kra ti schen  Regime führ te.
I. Introduction
When, in 2000, non violent protests succeeded in ousting Slobodan Milošević in
Serbia, few thought this would be the beginning of a new wave of democratisa-
tion, or at least the weakening of authoritarian regimes, in the post - socialist
world. Despite rumours that a similar strategy was being pursued by other move-
ments throughout the post - socialist space, the Georgian events in 2003 still
came as a relative surprise. A few months later, Ukraine, despite the size of the
country, its regional differences, and the failure of such protests in the past, also
experienced massive protests that changed the course of its history. At this point
the colour revolution phenomenon gained such momentum, with both govern-
ments and oppositions concentrating their efforts on civil society,1 that the Tulip
revolution seemed destined to happen as a natural consequence of Kyrgyzstan’s
parliamentary elections in February and March 2005.2 The fact that regime -
change did occur in Kyrgyzstan arising from the elections prompted scholars to
investigate the origins, connections, common features and future trends of all
movements participating in the colour revolutions. 
Whereas the first substantial NGO mobilization in the post - socialist world
was witnessed in Slovakia in 1998,3 Bunce and Wolchik look further back and
see the origins of this bottom up strategy in the Serbian attempts to challenge
Milošević (1996/97), and subsequent Romanian (1996) and Bulgarian (1997)
“electoral revolutions” that gave a democratic opposition an electoral victory.4
The idea of mobilizing people, during and after an election campaign, had been
witnessed for the first time in the 1990s but the second element of those move-
ments, their non violent character, had been introduced long before, with promi-
nent examples including the Polish Solidarno[ movement in 1980/81, the Velvet
Revolution in Czechoslovakia (1989), and the protests in the Baltic states
(1989–91) and Ukraine (1990).
Whether colour revolutions are still in progress is not clear for two reasons.
First of all, if a non violent protest movement does not lead to any political
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Wave” of Post - Communist Democratic Revolutions. In : Perspectives on Politics, 5
(2007) 3, pp. 537–553. Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful : A
Century of Nonviolent Conflict, Palgrave 2001. 
4 See Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, International Diffusion and Postcommunist
Electoral Revolutions. In : Communist and Post - Communist Studies, 39 (2006) 3, pp.
283–304.
change, can we still refer to it as a ( failed ) colour revolution ?5 Secondly, are
colour revolutions restricted to post socialist spaces or can we use the expression
also to define the events witnessed, for instance, in Nepal (2006) or Burma
(2007) ? A non violent strategy has been introduced and tested mostly in post -
socialist spaces but we do not exclude that, with the appropriate modifications, it
may be extended to other countries thus becoming a global phenomenon. 
In this article, we have chosen to concentrate on three case studies, Georgia,
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, to illustrate the way different political environments led
to similar results. By this choice we do not intend to deny the importance of
“failed revolutions” to the understanding of the phenomenon; however, we
believe that a major contribution can be made to the debate given the amount of
primary material we have collected in these three countries. Both authors have
worked for the Soros funded Civic Education Project as Fellows in Georgia,
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan ( Ó Beacháin ) and Ukraine ( Polese ) and overall
have spent more than half a dozen years living in the region. This has enabled
them to witness some revolutions, gain an understanding of foreign NGOs work-
ing in the region, and meet with key actors at all levels of society. As a result this
article is based, apart from an analysis of secondary sources and media monitor-
ing, on participant observation and interviews both with key actors and “ordi-
nary people”. Given the typology of the material in our possession we think it is
valuable to debate, in the course of this article, the importance of external fac-
tors in the three chosen cases to provide material for a better conceptualisation
of the phenomenon. 
The paper is structured as follows : after discussing the importance of the
external factor in general to the attempted and successful colour revolutions we
set out to present three case studies to elucidate the role and impact of foreign
influences on protest movements and political change in the post - Soviet space. 
II. Throwing stones in glasshouses
Most of the post - Soviet elites were perturbed by the events in Ukraine, Georgia
and Kyrgyzstan, and, to legitimise their hostility to the revolutions, condemned
what they argued were American backed coups d’état. Criticism of the over-
thrown authoritarian regimes was replaced by sermons on the criminal injustice
of “foreign intervention”. Putin declared the revolutions to be acts of “political -
technology”, skilfully managed by the west. Russian analysts weighed in with crit-
ical evaluations;6 small numbers of professional revolutionaries had been trained
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5 See, for instance, events in Azerbaijan (2005), Belarus (2003 and 2006), Kazakhstan
(2006) and Moldova (2005). 
6 Cf. Russia : Putin Defends Reforms, Condemns ‘Revolutions’. In : RFE Online 23
December 2004; Russian FM Blames OSCE for Kyrgyz Unrest. In : RFE / RL 24 March
with the sole intention of artificially fermenting political upheaval while giving
the impression that such revolts were spontaneous and enjoyed popular support
while the reality was different. Thanks to the support of western politicians and
western money protesters could get American winter boots and buy Russian
vodka to keep people on the streets and give the impression of popular support
for such actions. According to this view, these “manufactured democracies”
were merely a cover for more sinister motives, aimed at extending US influence
over the CIS. Few of the authoritarian leaders or their political acolytes in state
academia or media saw any irony in their criticisms. After all, the idea of a small
band of professional revolutionaries seizing power was the chief communist tac-
tic devised and implemented by Lenin throughout the territories of the Russian
Empire in 1917 after the 1905 “rehearsals”. Indeed, the position of autocrats
like Vladimir Putin and Islam Karimov who complain of feigned emotions,
flawed political processes, and artificial movements is one of rank hypocrisy.
Putin, after all, is a former KGB agent who spent many years hunting dissidents
in East Germany, a state that, under Soviet pressure, had perfected the art of
compelling the population to participate in “spontaneous” and “genuine”
parades and rallies to demonstrate support for the ruling regime. Islam Karimov
is a former communist boss turned pseudo national leader who, in 2000, saw no
harm in a two - man presidential contest in which his opponent advertised his
intention of voting for Karimov.
The history of the Cold War was not only a clash of competing ideologies, but
also of rival states that, due to their expansionism, would have collided in the
20th Century even if Russia had not embarked on the communist path.7 That
hostilities should be resumed after Russia recovered from the blows of Soviet
collapse is not surprising. From the beginning of the Cold War, the US and
Russia learned to justify their intervention anywhere in the world by referring to
ideological imperatives. Americans always intervened, and keep doing so, in the
name of democracy, whereas the USSR backed movements of national liberation
to gain influence in the country. Little has changed except that “international ter-
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In : RFE / RL 25 March 2005; Mark Almond, The Price of People Power. In : The
Guardian 7 December 2004; Kelley Matt, US Money Has Helped Opposition in
Ukraine. In : The Guardian, 11 December 2004; Ian Traynor, US Campaign Behind the
Turmoil in Kiev. In : The Guardian 26 November 2004; The OTPOR factor in the
Ukraine ? In : Pravda, 23 November 2004; Ukraine crisis : A Western circus with
Yushchenko, the clown. In : Pravda, 25 November 2004. More enthusiastic views on
the revolutions can be read in Andreas Aslund, Ukraine whole and free : what I saw at
the orange revolution, The Weekly Standard, 27 December 2004; Paul D’Anieri, The
Last Hurrah : the 2004 Elections and the Limits of Machine Politics, Communist and
Post - Communist Studies, 38 (2005) 2.
7 “Both were expansionist states whose respective spheres of interest eventually would
expand to global dimensions”, Powaski has concluded, “such ambitious nations
seemed destined to collide”. Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War : The United States and
the Soviet Union 1917–1991, Oxford 1998, p. 2. 
rorism” has now been added to the interventionist lexicon, when neither the
promise of democracy nor the existence of national liberation movements can be
clearly demonstrated. 
Deciding who has the legal right to intervene in a given territory has been of
limited utility as power has convinced successive Russian and American leaders
that their meddling in the affairs of other states is just and legitimate. In
September 2002, Russia bombed Georgia from the air for allegedly harbouring
Chechen fighters in the Pankisi Gorge, which can be viewed as a similar act to
the American bombing of Libya in 1986 intended as punishment for Ghadaffi’s
alleged dabbling in international terrorism. Putin has rightly identified a double
standard when, for example, Kosovo is considered to be a candidate for self -
determination despite being a part of Serbia according to international law,
while the same logic is not applied to Abkhazia or South Ossetia.8 However,
Putin does his position favouring territorial integrity a great disservice by on the
one hand supporting the Serb position on Kosovo and repressing separatists in
Chechnya while openly encouraging and supporting separatism in Georgia as
means of applying pressure on the Tbilisi government. 
From an American perspective, the collapse of the USSR removed the Soviet
threat and dictators could no longer hide behind the skirts of the superpowers.
In particular, Latin American and African dictators found it more difficult to
attract US support after the collapse of the USSR. Russia, the main Soviet suc-
cessor state and long - time imperial power, has had to scale down her ambitions
of global domination. Russia, however, still considers the territory of the former
Soviet Union to be her natural sphere of influence. How else can we explain
Russian’s strong opposition to the democratic decision of sovereign govern-
ments like those in the Baltic States to become members of the EU and NATO ?
Rather than consider such decisions to be voluntary expressions of national
wills, Russia insists on viewing them through the prism of Cold War politics.
According to this view, America is seeking to consolidate its Cold War victory
and, worse, to humiliate Russia by weaning former Soviet Republics away from
the mother country. Unable to play the card of international terrorism, as in Iraq
and Afghanistan, the US has decided that a more nuanced approach is necessary
in the former Soviet Bloc; a silent and yet highly orchestrated series of revolu-
tions designed to create western - orientated elites and thus outflank Russia in the
never - ending Cold War game of chess. But to accept the neo - Soviet analysis of
US inspired and funded manufactured democracies is to confuse Georgia and
Ukraine with Iraq. This kind of revolution will not work as long as local people
do not want it or feel ready for it. And while it is true that the US has pumped
money into the former Soviet Republics to gain influence, Russia has conducted
a similar policy. In particular, the supply of energy from Russia to the former
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renewed dialogue regarding some of the Russian Federation’s own errant republics
like Chechnya or Tatarstan. 
Soviet Republics is also a tool to exert influence. Those perceived to be leaving
the Russian orbit have found that energy subsidies, or even supplies, can be
abruptly halted. Using her impressive coercive power, Russia has tried to demon-
strate that the countries of the “near abroad” should concentrate their atten-
tions, if not their affections, on their large neighbour rather than their distant
friend. As both Russia and the US seek to maximize their influence in the post -
Soviet space, the Russian complaint of “foreign interference” is curious, to say
the least. 
Both the United States and Russia have invested incalculable amounts of
money and human capital into the CIS countries. It is not crucial who has
invested what in any particular country but how that money has been received;
accepting money or even expertise does not necessarily mean accepting a politi-
cal philosophy. Morrison has shown how western styles of factory management
were re - interpreted in Russia to create a new system of values and administra-
tion that little resembled the original models9 while Yong has exposed how
money received in Ukraine served the career goals of the individual rather than
support civil society.10 Stiglitz has highlighted how loans from the World Bank to
Russia were transferred into Cyprus bank accounts without resulting in any sig-
nificant change in the country.11 Domestic politics and societal norms are crucial
determinants and investment does not guarantee compliance or even amity.
Currency conversions, put simply, do not imply ideological ones. 
It is our contention that the revolutionary movements of Georgia and Ukraine
have had less an effect on the political systems than on the people who partici-
pated in these mass events. A revolution implies change on a mass level, not
merely a modification of the highest echelons. Democracy is not a commodity
that can be bought; it is a way of life that is daily affirmed, sometimes in the most
trivial of ways. Saakashvili and Yushchenko did not introduce the idea of democ-
racy to their respective countries.12 Rather the democratic sentiments and
actions of such large numbers of active citizens in Georgia and Ukraine have
given the new presidents an opportunity to export the democratic aspirations of
those who braved the winter cold into the heart of government. 
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Through social and political organization Georgian and Ukrainian people
trained themselves to build meritocratic structures and to respect them.13 This is
the real transformation; it is what happens before, not after, the “revolution”. If
Ukrainian and Georgian people have succeeded in organizing themselves during
the “revolution”, to maintain a peaceful movement in the face of provocation
and frustration, to negotiate calmly with different interests, to contemplate the
fundamental reorganization of their country, to think and not to be afraid to
express their opinion – then these are the main successes of the revolution.
Irrespective of whether the Ukrainians had been able to change the elections, it
was soon clear that the elections had changed the Ukrainians,14 while the
Georgian people put into practice the social contract in its purest form; “no
longer seeing Shevardnadze’s government as legitimate, they invoked their right
to remove it.”15
The situation in Kyrgyzstan, though leading to a superficially similar result, is
sufficiently different to set it apart from the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.
A combination of western funding, domestic enthusiasm, and a weak state ruled
by a president liberal by the standards of the region, had encouraged the growth
of a vibrant civil society in many pockets of Kyrgyzstani society. Following the
examples of Georgia and Ukraine, a number of groups openly mimicked the
symbols and slogans of the Rose and Orange Revolutions. In the end, however,
Akaev was ousted by shadowy figures whose agendas converged little with pro -
democracy agitators except that they too wished to see the back of the Kyrgyz
President. The “new” elite that reaped the political rewards arising from the
upheaval was very much a re - cycling of discarded Akaev ministers. Though
Kyrgyzstan shared many political conditions that had encouraged revolution in
Georgia and Ukraine, the importance of southern clan loyalties had no obvious
parallel in the Rose and Orange Revolutions. And while the struggle to topple
Akaev did generate enthusiasm among civil society actors, these were quickly
sidelined during the final push and when the political spoils were distributed.
Moreover, the retention of the parliament produced by the discredited elections
that precipitated the anti - Akaev protests further weakened the new leadership’s
claim to represent a radical departure from past politics. 
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not adopting any classical hierarchical structure is of very moment to future democra-
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14 Abel Polese, The Future is Orange ? In : Transitions Online, 26 November 2004.
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Problems of Post - Communism, 51 (2004) 2, pp. 12–21.
III. Rose Revolution in Georgia
To understand the Rose Revolution, it is imperative to understand the dynamics
of Georgian politics since the unravelling of Soviet domination in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. More particularly, it is necessary to comprehend the circum-
stances that brought Eduard Shevardnadze to power, why the Georgian people
initially welcomed him as a saviour, and why, ultimately, they felt compelled to
dismiss him prematurely. 
Known as the “silver fox” because of his crafty nature, Shevardnadze has also
been described as a cat, not merely because of his nine lives, but also because of
his ability to always land on his feet regardless of the situation.16 Understandably,
Shevardnadze objects to the term “revolution” being used to describe his
removal from power and regrets not having anticipated events better : “I hate the
word ‘revolution’. It was not a revolution. Forty or fifty people breaking into par-
liament – can you call that a revolution ? [...] I felt it was a coup. I was forced out,
and another man, who is President today, took my place.”17
Shevardnadze notes that such collective action was not unprecedented in
Georgia, and reminds us that in November 2003 “it was the people coming into
the streets, and we’ve had quite a few of these episodes during the last decade,
although they have not usually resulted in a change of power.”18 The word “usu-
ally” is important here, for since the collapse of the USSR there had only been
one unconstitutional change of power as a result of irregular forms of protest
and that had benefited Shevardnadze. In 1991, the democratically elected
President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was violently overthrown, not by
mass peaceful protests, but by ambitious warlords shelling the parliament build-
ing, where the hapless President had taken refuge. He escaped to Chechnya and
received asylum. Gamsakhurdia and his supporters maintained that he was the
legitimate President of Georgia until his death in 1994.
For Eduard Shevardnadze the years immediately following 1991 were per-
haps the most challenging and successful in his long and varied career. On many
occasions, he has pointed out that when he arrived in Tbilisi in March 1992,
there was no legitimate government, chaos, gunfire in the streets and men armed
with Kalashnikovs walking into cafes. Within two years, Georgia became an
internationally recognized state with a constitution, a functioning parliament,
and relatively fair and free elections. He had proved no better than
Gamsakhurdia in tackling the thorny issue of secessionism in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, although he had demonstrated considerable personal valour by
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travelling to Sukhumi,19 the Abkhaz capital, at the height of the war and staying
until the very end of hostilities. It is not inaccurate to say that by 1995 – or at a
stretch by 1997 – Shevardnadze had achieved much but politically had outlived
his utility. Already in his mid sixties, Shevardnadze had put the institutions of the
state in place but now fell back on his instincts and skills, honed during the
Brezhnev years, of managing people rather than implementing policy. The ship
of state had been built and it was now “steady as she goes”. Shevardnadze was at
his best as a “fixer” of problems especially when a myriad of strong and conflict-
ing personalities had to be managed. In November 2003, on the eve of the revo-
lution, Shevardnadze was 75 years old and constitutionally obliged to step down
when his term ended in 2005. He did not relish conversations on this subject,
however. “Trying to talk to Shevardnadze four times in 2003 about what his
future plans would be after his term ended”, one of his closest advisors recalls,
“was like committing suicide four times”.20
Despite new electoral legislation, $2.4 million paid by the US government to
help the Shevardnadze administration prepare for the ballot and no less than
five thousand watchful observers, the parliamentary elections held on 2
November 2003 indicated that procedural correctness had declined from the
already low standards marking previous contests. The opposition parties did not
maintain that they had gained a clear majority of votes rather they contested the
accuracy of the results. According to Saakhishvili’s estimations, his party came
first but did not win a majority. Shevardnadze’s acolytes would have remained in
power and even perhaps retained a constitutional majority ( a parliamentary
majority large enough to change the constitution ). A combination of traditional
Soviet training, pure autocratic thought, and the symbolic importance of being
“first” meant that the margin between opposition and Shevardnadze’s party
might be small, but it was inconceivable that the government party could lose.
Moreover, there was the alliance with Aslan Abashidze, who, as the authoritar-
ian leader of the autonomous republic of Adjara could gain almost complete vic-
tory through fraud. Abashidze could expect nothing less than to be placed sec-
ond after Shevardnadze in spite of receiving less votes than Saakashvili’s
National Movement. Thus, regardless of the actual vote there was a political and
symbolic imperative, which demanded that the National Movement should come
third. It would be a respectable third, but third nonetheless. 
The OSCE, which often uses standard formulas such as elections “fell below
international standards”, was unusually harsh in its assessment of the election
results. The organization’s report concluded that the election was “character-
ized by a clear lack of political will by the authorities to organize a genuine dem-
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ocratic election process resulting in widespread and systematic election fraud.”21
This was more than criticism; it was a dismissal. In allowing the corruption of the
election process, which Shevardnadze usually attributed to over - zealous local
officials, the Georgian President revealed not only his contempt for democratic
principles but also a clear disregard for Western protests. Previous elections in
the former USSR in his eyes had demonstrated the perfunctionary nature of
western remonstrations. They were part of the democratic ritual; meaningless
diplomatic motions, which would in no way hinder the continuation of regular
political exchange. One of Shevardnadze’s closest associates visited him in the
immediate aftermath of the elections armed with negative international assess-
ments of the elections. “You amuse me”, Shevardnadze responded, “Don’t you
know how these Westerners are ? They will make a fuss for a few days, and they
will calm down and life will go on as usual.”22 Protests in central Tbilisi began
almost immediately after the elections on 4 November quickly gaining support
among the population. Until Shevardnadze’s fall on 23 November, protesters
were continuously on the streets as one participant explained :
During the day there were several thousand people outside the parliament –
from the Marriott Hotel to Freedom Square. People would stay until about mid-
night and then after that there was only a core of people who were staying –
between three and five hundred – overnight. So the place was never abandoned
but most of the people were going home to sleep. But then on the critical nights,
many people stayed, and when the whole thing reached a climax people were
standing all night because people feared that they would come and take the par-
liament back so they were staying there all night.23
Shevardnadze insisted that the election results were correct and began to
devise ever - more exotic explanations for the voting irregularities and the result-
ing critique. On 7 November, he publicly addressed the issue of George Soros
and the role of his organizations in undermining trust in the government and the
electoral process. While admitting that some violations had taken place, the
Georgian President questioned the role of particular international organiza-
tions. “What does Soros want ? I am declaring a categorical protest against the
actions of Soros”, Shevardnadze declared, adding, “everyone should know their
place.”24 The Georgian President then decided to talk to the protesters directly,
as one Kmara leader recalls : “In the middle of one protest, early in the morning,
about eight o’clock, even earlier, he [ Shevardnadze ] went there to the demon-
stration – alone – with one car and three guards. He got out [...] and then he was
trying to talk to people but everyone was, like, avoiding him, like he was diseased
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or something. He was trying to talk to someone but couldn’t catch anyone until
he caught one little boy, about ten years old and asked the boy ‘aren’t you
afraid?’ And the boy said, ‘aren’t you afraid ?’ And then Misha [ Saakashvili ]
came.”25
Shevardnadze left the crowd and held unsuccessful and acrimonious talks
with Mikheil Saakashvili, leader of the National Movement and already emerg-
ing as the main rival to Shevardnadze, Zurab Zhvania, former Prime Minister
and Shevardnadze acolyte turned dissident, and the independent speaker of par-
liament, Nino Burjanadze, also an erstwhile associate of the Georgian President.
Having failed to woo the pro - democracy protesters, the Georgian President now
had to look for autocratic support. Shevardnadze’s increasing co - operation with
and dependence on the Adjaran regional despot, Aslan Abashidze, was seen by
many as a demonstration of his worst characteristics; his willingness to enter into
any alliance and sacrifice any moral principles in order to stay in power. The
alliance with Abashidze made a mockery of any claims to represent democratic
values or to be a force for unity. Abashidze was a classic dictator; the state was
organized along feudal lines and controlled in a totalitarian fashion by the police.
Though an integral part of Georgia Adjara was not in fact under Tbilisi control
and on 7 November, Abashidize unilaterally announced that he had changed the
constitution of the Adjaran Autonomous Republic. It was a clear threat to the
territorial integrity of Georgia, but he simultaneously pledged to do everything
necessary to keep Shevardnadze in power : “If President Shevardnadze is not
able to bring order, I will help him”.26 The implication of force was clear but
rather than rebuking Abashidze, Shevardnadze welcomed his support and
embraced the Adjaran autocrat. On 10 November, the Georgian President flew
to Batumi, where he was personally chauffeured by his Adjaran ally. Declaring
that he had “very much wanted to meet with Mr. Abashidze”, Shevardnadze
cemented his new alliance by claiming that “we were, are, and will be together.”
Abashidze, in turn, ominously vowed to “defend legal governmental powers.
There cannot even be talk of changing the leadership of Georgia”. Forecasting
that if the opposition bloc came to power this “would be a catastrophe for
Georgia”, he said that “the enemies of Georgia, both from inside and outside the
borders, were beginning to attack”.27
Undoubtedly, the successful invasion of parliament on 22 November 2003
marked the climax of the Rose Revolution as tens of thousands surrounded the
government buildings. Shevardnadze, who was addressing the new assembly,
was whisked away by security as a defiant Saakashvili forced his way into the leg-
islature. Negotiations then took place between Shevardnadze and the opposition
leaders, while both the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and the American
ambassador Richard Miles offered their services for mediation. In the night,
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Shevardnadze declared a state of emergency but it became clear that he could no
longer rely on the security forces for some had allowed protesters to enter the
parliament buildings. Gia Nodia has accurately described the sequence of events
in Shevardnadze’s last hours :
“In situations like that so much is psychological. It’s about losing your nerve, losing
your willpower. They just lost willpower [...] because these rallies continued for so
long and, of course, the media was very powerful on the side of the opposition. I
think they eroded their power base in the armed forces; the army and police. The
people in those forces made up their mind and said we are not going to defend this
government. It was very difficult to predict but it happened. I think that
Shevardnadze's strategy was that he thought that time was on his side; people will get
tired, the protest and energy will peter out, the weather was cold, etc. And he did not
want to use force; he counted on that. But as these protests continued and as time
passed they gained strength rather than diminished strength – his plan crumbled
because of that [...] morale in the government was eroded, more and more people
started to switch sides [...]. After being ousted from parliament I believe he was
ready finally, psychologically ready, to use force but by that stage he simply did not
have force to use. It was too late.”28
Saakashvili and Zurab Zhvania met with Shevardnadze on the 23 November.
Nino Burjanadze, who, as parliamentary speaker, had been persuaded by
Saakashvili to declare herself interim President, stayed in front of parliament
buildings with the protesters. Whereas Shevardnadze has presented his decision
to resign the same day as based on his wish to avoid any bloodshed, Saakashvili
has explained that the Georgian President “was forced into resigning because
everyone had deserted him.”29
Though Shevardnadze was a hate figure for many in Russia and held respon-
sible for the collapse of the Soviet Union, a consensus emerged in the Kremlin
that the Rose Revolution represented a defeat for Russian power in the region
and resulted from a carefully orchestrated American conspiracy to install a more
malleable regime in Tbilisi. Prominent activists and NGO leaders in Georgia
reject the notion that the Rose Revolution was a coup manufactured by the West,
as Liberty Institute Director, Levan Ramishvili, explained :
“It’s not only in Moscow [ that this argument is popular ]; it was also said in some
western media outlets. It reminds me of Soviet propaganda; when everything that
was not controlled by the Kremlin and by the Politbüro was perceived as a CIA plot.
It’s maybe some sort of racism; that only white people in western Europe can be the
initiators of democratic peaceful revolution, that we in this part of the world just can
kill each other and if something happens that means it was somehow imported
because we intellectually can somehow not handle this, because we are too stupid to
be democratic agents. Of course, western influence played an important role in
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everything because all these techniques, all these methodologies, all these manuals,
tool - kits, I downloaded them from various anti - globalisation websites ( laughs ) [...] of
course financial assistance was important; without this, it would have been much
more difficult. But I don’t think that this was decisive.”30
Until the end, the US embassy in Georgia had seen its role as a mediator
between Shevardnadze and the opposition. Indeed, according to one well - placed
observer the US ambassador “tried to calm down the revolutionaries and stop
them from being too radical.”31 All the Americans demanded was free and fair
elections but since the regime did not intend to grant them, US involvement
appeared a blatant endorsement of the opposition. 
Victory for the opposition had been far from certain. No one could have been
sure that a large body of protesters would be sufficiently motivated to persevere
for several weeks during cold and wet November weather. It was not clear if such
large crowds could remain disciplined and peaceful, nor was it certain that the
government forces would not use violence to dispel the crowd. Events could have
spiralled out of control leading even to a civil war. That wiser counsels prevailed
is a credit to all sides. Memories of how quickly protest had triggered the civil
war in the early 1990s had a restraining influence on everybody. Certainly,
Shevardnadze supporters exploited fears of a return to the months succeeding
the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia in 1992, as one Rustavi 2 presenter recalled :
“Shevardnadze people were playing on that; that’s exactly what they were play-
ing at. They were saying ‘don’t go out on to the streets’. TV was saying –
Shevardnadze - supporting TV was saying – ‘bloodshed will happen; we’ve been
through this before. Georgians ! What are you doing ?’ This was their major
theme. Nobody got scared – luckily.”32
Shevardnadze might have held on, had he been able to secure some external
intervention. But, while external actors were willing to mediate, Shevardnadze
had lost vital political support. He obtained the moral support of the Armenian
and Azeri Presidents but both Russia and the United States professed neutrality.
And in a situation where the legitimacy of the government was at stake, neutral-
ity was interpreted as hostility by the regime and as encouragement by the oppo-
sition. 
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IV. Orange Revolution in Ukraine
On Monday 22 November 2004, as snow was softly falling on Kiev, the main
road, Boulevard Krishchatek, was occupied by several people fighting wind and
cold to put up tents beside each other in the street. PORA, the main NGO of the
homonymous civic campaign and the coordinator of street protests, was estab-
lishing its headquarters in the centre of Kiev, while Yuliya Timoshchenko, from a
stage set in the middle of Maidan Nezalezhnosti ( Independence Square, here-
inafter Maidan ), cried out against election fraud. 
External forces were far from neutral in November 2004 when whole teams
of diplomats and politicians were deployed in Ukraine.33 The whole election
campaign, from the registration of candidates to the Yushchenko inauguration,
can also be seen as an attempt by the West to catch up and counterbalance
Russian influence in the country. 
Because Moscow’s presence in domestic politics had only been partially
reduced after 1991, the West, during the 2004 electoral campaign, appeared as
an intruder to the Kremlin. The US alone allocated more than 65 million dollars
in 2003/2004 to support democratic initiatives, including independent media
and NGO training. The Open Society Institute also instituted a fund from which
NGOs could obtain election monitoring know - how. Support was also granted in
the form of training in capacity building and non - violent methods of protest.
Ukrainian NGO leaders and activists had been invited, since 2000, to interna-
tional trainings in non - violent protest movements and civic disobedience.34 As a
complementary strategy, activists from Otpor ( Serbia ) and Kmara ( Georgia ) vis-
ited Ukraine to train local leaders.35
Russia could not be considered alien to the election campaign either though
evidence was not easy to find as political elites were not always transparent36
and the management of both external donations and state funds was not well
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publicized.37 However the poisoning of Yushchenko,38 allegedly prepared with
the help of the FSB and the frequency of Kuchma - Putin visits,39 were a clear sig-
nal that Moscow’s attitude in 2004 would not be less intrusive than had been the
case in the 2002 contest.40
The 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine were held according to a classic
scenario. Since the Constitution did not allow the president to run for a further
term,41 a man who could continue the president’s work was unofficially
appointed some time before the elections. Viktor Yanukovich, an extremely pop-
ular figure in Donetsk having served as local governor (1997–2002), was
appointed prime minister in 2002, early enough to gain popularity at national
level. Yanukovich presented two main advantages : a high number of supporters
in the pivotal, densely populated eastern regions – and controllability, being at
risk of kompromat.42
The candidate the opposition would choose had been clear since 2002, when
Our Ukraine became the largest party in the country : Viktor Yushchenko, for-
mer head of the national bank, Prime Minister from 1999 to 2001 and founder
of the Our Ukraine bloc, was the favourite for the presidential post.43
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42 Yanukovich had been imprisoned in 1967 for robbery ( then amnestied ) and in 1970
for assault and battery.
43 At first “Our Ukraine” and the Tymoshenko bloc supported Yushchenko. After the
first round the Socialist Party of Oleksandr Moroz, who failed to win enough votes,
also joined the “orange coalition”. The Communist Party, headed by Petro Simonenko,
refused to support either candidate in the runoff.
From the beginning of the campaign, Russia preached a position of neutrality
that, as in the Georgian case, had a deep political significance. Putin declared his
will to let Ukraine freely choose its president but, given the historical involve-
ment of Moscow in Ukrainian politics, this sounded rather like “the West should
take care of its own business and let Ukraine follow its course”.
For their part, the EU and US, while acknowledging Ukraine’s low standards
in matters of human rights, media freedom, and the capacity to comply with
good electoral standards, made clear that they hoped, or even expected, that
elections would be fair and free.44
After the first round of the elections, Yushchenko, despite infractions regis-
tered all over the country, had a slight advantage on his opponent : 39.87 %
against 39.32 % The opposition preferred not to complain too much, sparing
energy and resources for the runoff. Russia and the West waited; the first, confi-
dent, the latter hopeful. The fact that the authorities had acknowledged
Yushchenko’s superiority encouraged the secret hope that a combination of mas-
sive support for Yushchenko and the limitations of falsification technology,
unable to deal with such high preferences for the opposition candidate, would
allow Yushchenko a victory in the second round.
Behind the scenes, nonetheless, the scenario for a revolution was being set. As
it turned out afterwards, the opposition anticipated most of the techniques that
pro - Yanukovich forces intended to use ( including allowing a slight Yushchenko
edge in the first round to give the impression of honesty ). This is why the period
between the 31 October and 21 November 2004 can be seen as the most intense
of the campaign : an agreement with security forces had to be reached,45 logisti-
cal preparation of the protest had to be perfected and people had to be moti-
vated to take to the streets in case of massive falsifications.46
The 21 November ballot was a formality : that evening government exit polls
announced a Yanukovich victory and this was confirmed by the official results of
the Central Electoral Commission after the counting of around ninety percent of
ballots ( it had taken three weeks to count the first round ballots ). The following
day Putin congratulated Yanukovich and three days afterwards the Electoral
Commission officially announced Yanukovich’s victory.
The opposition promptly reacted : the day of the elections, irrespective of the
result, a stage was set in Maidan.47 In the evening, parallel exit polls carried out
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47 The manner in which the results would be falsified was clear to the opposition, as is
made clear in the transcription of telephone conversations published in Ukrainska
by experts not related to the government like the Kiev International Institute of
Sociology gave the opposite verdict to the official one and the opposition called
for people to go down to the street and occupy the centre of Kiev for an historic
protest that would change the history of the country.
The United States firmly refused to accept the results of the elections and pre-
pared a list of Ukrainians who would be denied a visa should Yanukovich
become president. The European Union, although unable to produce a common
position, informally pressurised Russia and at the EU - Russia summit on the 25
November in Hague there was little space for discussion of any issue other than
Ukraine. Russia, in turn, played the card of speed and non interference : once the
results were known, it made no sense to discuss them – after all the US presiden-
tial elections in 2000 had been alleged to be rigged.
Perhaps, in a different context, claims of falsifications would have been
ignored and, after some noise, the results would have been acknowledged; but
November 2004 in Ukraine was a turning point for the opposition, which,
emboldened by an unprecedented crowd, would be the decisive influence on
events.
The crowd picketed the parliament, blocked the streets, and virtually stopped
the country. The message was clear : “we will not move from here as long as jus-
tice is not done”. There was no reason for the government to be worried but for
the quantity and quality of the protesters, living in a “city of tents” in the centre
of the capital indifferent to snow and below - zero temperatures, and reaching
one million protesters on 27 November, when Kreshchatik became an immense
open air discotheque. The final dismissal of the “tent city” would happen only
after Yushchenko’s inauguration in January 2005. 
The days preceding the result of political negotiations were extremely tense;
there was increasing international attention on Ukraine and the crowd became a
political actor to be reckoned with, uncomfortable for the government and
Russia but nightmarishly real. In this respect, government forces split into those
willing and unwilling to use force to disperse the protesters. The former recalled
that similar anti government actions had been sedated by the police in 2000 and
2001 and advocated a similar strategy : provocateurs attempted to infiltrate to
provoke riots while the army was being mobilized. Rumours of Russian troops
crossing the border and deploying around Kiev also reached the ear of the peo-
ple but, ultimately, force remained an unused option for two main reasons. 
Firstly, there was a lack of agreement within the governmental forces for a
number of Ministry of Interior officials made clear that they would refuse to
attack their own people. In this respect the slogan “militsiya s narodom”48 was
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just the climax of long and tense negotiations that neutralized the threat of police
confrontation.49 The second reason for police inertia was the size of the
protests. Nobody, not even the most optimistic opposition leaders, had expected
such a massive mobilization of people.50
Another government tactic was to organize a “blue force” to counterbalance
the orange one. Yanukovich supporters occupied an area close to the railway sta-
tion and pitched tents some 500 metres from Maidan. At first, some physical
assaults to orange supporters were recorded but, after a few days, it became
clear that counter - protests were not an option to balance the orange supporters :
either Yanukovichers, upon meeting with Yushchenkoers, engaged in political,
and pacific, debate and ended up eating all together at the free buffet in Maidan,
before taking a final family blue - orange picture together, or just faded away, sup-
posedly returning home.
Once the whole country was blocked because of massive strikes, with the cen-
tre of the capital gathering crowds of hundreds of thousands of people for more
than a week, and with no end in sight, the existence of a political crisis was
impossible to deny. As Ukraine was unable to deal with it alone, the EU sent its
representative, Javier Solana, together with Polish and Lithuanian presidents
Aleksander Kwasnieski and Valdas Adamkus. The OSCE sent Jan Kubis, while
Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister and Ukrainian president Leonid
Kuchma completed the team mediating the Yushchenko - Yanukovich negotia-
tions.
The official results of the negotiations are of secondary importance to the
very fact that negotiations were held at all, that the government had been obliged
to step back and acknowledge the importance of the opposition in domestic pol-
itics. Eventually negotiations would lead to a constitutional reform that would
transform the country, after the 2006 parliamentary elections, from a presiden-
tial to a parliamentary republic. The negotiations gave the opposition what it
wanted, the possibility of repeating the second round, while keeping Yanukovich
and his staff out of the main arena for little more than one year, during which
time he could organize to win back the prime ministerial post. 
The situation unlocked, the balance of external forces operating in the coun-
try changed radically. The EU had participated as a peer of Russia and could
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claim, in such a crisis situation, the same rights as Moscow to be involved in the
political decisions of Ukraine. Subsequent to this political agreement, the
Supreme Court was free to deliver a verdict on election falsification. Free is per-
haps not the best word; it might be more appropriate to say that the judges had
been subjected to psychological pressures ( and most likely death threats ) from
both sides. At least this is one interpretation of the judge’s hiccup attack while
reading out the final verdict.
The circle had to be closed. On the 2 December, Kuchma flew to Moscow,
meeting Putin, to discuss the results of the negotiations. Both, Kuchma and
Putin, criticized the decision to run a third round : “what if people are not satis-
fied with this ? Are we going to have a fourth and a fifth one until everybody is
satisfied ?” Timid attempts were made to propose the holding of brand new elec-
tions in 2005 but they went unheeded. Russia de facto had accepted “foreign”
influences in Ukrainian elections. The enthusiasm for this historic moment was
visible : thousands of election observers were sent to Ukraine and the eyes of the
world witnessed Yushchenko’s victory, 51.99 percent against to 44.20 for
Yanukovich. On the 23 January 2005 Yushchenko was sworn in as president of
Ukraine and Yuliya Tymoshenko, known to Ukraine as the most charismatic
politician of the Orange Revolution, was appointed Prime Minister a few days
later by virtue of a secret agreement signed with Yushchenko during the election
campaign. 
The official position of Russia was, and is, that the Orange Revolution had
been a move of political technology, manoeuvred by the opposition and the west.
It is certainly true that the West had a major role in the events. Nonetheless,
given the size of the protests, the political maturity shown by the electorate
 during and after the 2004 events,51 the organization of NGOs, and the enthusi-
asm demonstrated, it can be argued that the people have influenced political
events at least as much as politics, including Western actors, have influenced the
people.
V. Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan
Since 1991, Kyrgyzstan had been ruled by Askar Akaev, a politician by accident
whose liberal instincts had won him widespread praise in the early nineties and
earned Kyrgyzstan the epithet “the island of democracy” in Central Asia.52 By
the end of the decade, most of the shine had gone from Akaev’s regime. Poverty
was rife, corruption institutionalised, and the Akaev family had enriched them-
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selves while simultaneously weakening rival power institutions.53 Akaev might
still have retired with honour and not a little gratitude had he stepped down in
2000 but his decision to contest the election that year, helped by creative consti-
tutional amendments, sealed his fate. Kyrgyzstan staggered amid growing debts
and institutional decay. Evidence that it might not all end peacefully first
emerged in 2002 when police shot dead six protesters in the southern town of
Aksy. Emboldened by a post 11 September anti - terrorist alliance with the United
States, Akaev had decided to act decisively against thousands of southern
demonstrators protesting against the imprisonment of popular local parliamen-
tarian, Azimbek Beknazarov, on politically motivated charges.54 Akaev
responded to the crisis by dismissing key officials, including Prime Minister
Kurmanbek Bakiev and promising a package of reforms. This bought Akaev
some time but he gained few friends in the process, and a large swath of opinion
in southern Kyrgyzstan remained implacably hostile to his regime.55
Parliamentary elections, held in two rounds on 27 February and 13 March,
were the trigger for the Tulip Revolution and the overthrow of Akaev. A key dif-
ference between the build up to the Kyrgyz elections and those that had pre-
ceded them in Georgia and Ukraine was how the expectation of a colour revolu-
tion became a big issue in the election, sometimes overshadowing the contest.
Deeply unsettled by the fate of Edward Shevardnadze, Akaev flagged his con-
cerns shortly after the Rose Revolution as his speeches adopted an unmistakably
anti - western character.56 On 25 December, the day before Yushchenko won the
“third” round of elections in Ukraine, Akaev addressed the people on state tele-
vision, criticized what he called “foreign funded revolutions”, and warned that
similar events in Kyrgyzstan would be detrimental to the people’s interests.57
Akaev returned to the theme on 11 January when making a major address pro-
claiming 2005 to be the year of social stability and housing construction : “What
makes the danger worse is that our homegrown provocateurs now have skilled
coaches who have learned how to use provocations [...] No significant event has
occurred [...] but certain groups are already trying to pitch tents and infect peo-
ple with the yellow plague [...] I want to call on the entire nation to counter the
exporters of revolution and the provocateurs.”58
The Kyrgyz opposition had also tried to learn lessons from the Rose and
Orange Revolutions. Following the example of Georgia and Ukraine, a small
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coterie of opposition activists in Bishkek sought to adopt the symbols that would
advertise and emblematise their cause. Initially some opposition leaders adopted
yellow while others favoured pink. Yet others donned purple. The lemon was
briefly considered by Kel - Kel ( Kyrgyzstan’s youth movement modelled on
Kmara and PORA ) as a possible symbol but this was replaced by the tulip partly
because the lemon was also adopted by a pro - government clone.59 When one
activist, soon to become a leader of Kel - Kel, arrived at the first protest in January
2005 she found a small group addressed by Tursenbek Akunov,60 a human rights
activist and parliamentary candidate in Naryn, who was trying gain a consensus
on what the symbols of the Kyrgyz revolutionary effort would be : “He was saying
‘that’s how history starts, look you are making history [...] should we chose the
tulip or should we chose that [...] will it be the tulip revolution, yeah it will be like
that’ because he was in Ukraine too and he likes this idea of a symbolic revolu-
tion [...] And next day when I came to the square, to the Jogorku Kenesh [ Kyrgyz
parliament ], these Human Rights Committee people were giving out yellow
colours already. I don’t know why they chose this colour but later on as I hear
Rosa Otubayeva was explaining to people that yellow is the colour of change, the
colour of optimism.”61
Alive to the threat to his position, Akaev moved closer to Russia. In 2003, a
Russian military base had opened in Kyrgyzstan and in the run - up to the parlia-
mentary elections, senior government officials, including Akaev himself, visited
Moscow. The Kyrgyz president introduced his son, Aidar, to Putin, provoking
speculation that Akaev was planning an Azerbaijani style transfer of power. On
his return from Moscow, Akaev announced a number of measures that
amounted to an expansion of the Russian military presence in Kyrgyzstan and a
corresponding diminution of US capabilities.62
Complementary to these moves closer to the Kremlin was a shift in Akaev’s
rhetoric towards criticizing many of his former admirers. George Soros, a fre-
quent visitor to Kyrgyzstan and former ally of Akaev in the 1990s, was now pre-
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59 In what must rank as one of the most bizarre tactics employed by the government to
counter a colour revolution, within two days of Kel - Kel’s founding the Akaev regime
manufactured a pro - government youth group also called Kel - Kel that adopted the
same slogans, symbols and website ( which was duly given to them ) but articulated a
different political message. The Akaev regime had obviously studied the rise of similar
youth movements in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine and concluded that they should be
nipped in the bud. 
60 In the 28 February vote, he received 828 votes (3.3 % of total cast ) in the Narinskii
Okrug ( No. 33). At time of writing ( January 2008) he remains a strong critic of the
Bakiev government. 
61 Senior Kel - Kel activist, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin, 10 March 2005. In
2005, Rosa Otunbayeva was a former foreign minister turned opposition leader who
was denied permission to contest the election. She had sought to register as a candi-
date in the university constituency in Bishkek, the same constituency that Akaev’s
daughter, Bermet, was contesting. 
62 Kommersant 12 February 2005 as reported in Gulnoza Saidazimova, Is Bishkek
Moving Toward Russia Ahead of Elections ? In : RFE / RL, 15 February 2005. 
sented as a bogeyman inciting mawkish youth to rebellion.63 The OSCE was crit-
icized for interfering in Kyrgyz domestic affairs and failing to understand local
realities.64 Preempting expected criticisms, the Kyrgyz Election Commission
chairman said that the CIS observer missions would assess the election “more
objectively and realistically” than the OSCE as “we share the same historical
background, we have a common mentality, a common culture.”65
The election did contain the usual flaws of many post - soviet contests.
Administrative resources were shamelessly misused, students were coerced into
voting en masse for pro - government candidates, and there had been intimidation
of independent media. On the other hand, only thirty one of the seventy five
available seats were filled in the first round suggesting a high level of competi-
tion.66 Though the south of Kyrgyzstan was in turmoil, with the second round of
elections behind him Akaev felt the worst was over and claimed that “we’ve dis-
covered an antidote to the ‘tulip’ revolution that they planned in our country.”67
Akaev was bluffing, of course; there was no antidote. Protests grew over the next
few days, particularly in the cities of Osh, Jalalabad, Naryn and Talas. Much of
the south became de facto impendent of Bishkek rule with government adminis-
tration in rebel hands; the sole highway connecting north and south ( which cut
through the mountains ) was shut and Osh airport was occupied to prevent the
government sending reinforcements. The opposition created a parallel system of
government in the south by occupying administration buildings in key cities and
electing popular governors to replace the Akaev government officials. Like
Shevardnadze in Georgia, Akaev’s death - knell accompanied his decision to
plough ahead and open the contentious new parliament. Sixty nine of parlia-
ment’s seventy five seats had been filled at this point and fifty eight members of
the newly elected legislature were in attendance. Twenty two members of the old
parliament signed a petition rejecting the new legislature in light of opposition
allegations of electoral fraud.
The climax in Bishkek on 24 March was sudden and unexpected. Several
thousand people representing a variety of different interests and regions con-
verged on Bishkek. Kel - Kel had prepared themselves for a long struggle and
tried to organize tents and food supplies for their protesters. In the afternoon,
several hundred protesters arrived from Osh, and despite appeals to join the
peaceful rally, they marched on the White House and were joined by others from
the rally. The willingness of the security forces to fire on people had notably
diminished at this stage. They were under instructions not to provoke a clash but
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the poorly paid police and troops were certainly not motivated to risk their lives
in a confrontation. Moreover, some police chiefs, perhaps detecting the way the
wind was blowing, made it clear publicly that if ordered to fire on demonstrators
they would refuse and join the protesters.68 After two assaults had been driven
back from the presidential palace the police were overwhelmed and fled. The
demonstrators then took control of the White House. Akaev had fled and it was
quickly announced that he had left the country. 
With the departure of Akaev, enthusiasts claimed that the Tulip Revolution
had triumphed and Kyrgyzstan had now followed the example of Georgia and
Ukraine. The situation was less disciplined, however, than had been the case in
Tbilisi and Kiev; a night of rioting and looting griped the city. Felix Kulov, the
former Mayor of Bishkek imprisoned by the Akaev regime in 2001 on politically
motivated charges, was rescued from prison by a mob that stormed the jail on 24
March and within hours was acting head of Kyrgyzstan’s security services with
the primary task of restoring order. He imposed a curfew on Bishkek, organized
militias and threatened that lethal force will be used to counter looters. Initially,
Akaev’s messages from abroad were defiant; he described his ousting as a coup
organized by political adventurers under the guise of false revolutionary slogans
and appeals. He also declared his intention not to resign though he eventually
relented and relinquished office in return for guarantees in a deal struck in
Moscow on 4 April.
Desperate for some good news in light of the deteriorating situation in Iraq,
the White House in Washington was quick to claim ownership of the revolution,
which only fed the spurious claims of Kremlin apologists. Praising US policies in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Wall Street Journal fancifully described Kyrgyzstan as
the latest state to join “the global march of freedom led by President Bush.”69
Certainly, Akaev’s departure aroused jubilation among key American funded
NGOs in Kyrgyzstan like the National Democratic Institute and the Soros
Foundation.70 A joint address to the Kyrgyz people on 31 March by Saakashvili
and Yushchenko, further fuelled accusations of a foreign conspiracy to export
revolution.71
Opinion makers in Russia were alarmed by events in Kyrgyzstan, which were
attributed to western mischief making and clan rivalries. The popular mood in
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68 When asked in a phone interview with Moscow’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta, whether he
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Russia was perhaps best captured in the title of one article published in the influ-
ential Komsomolskaya Pravda: “Are We Losing Kyrgyzstan ?” which corre-
sponded with the popular notion that Russia somehow “possessed” the Central
Asian state.72 But Putin had learned from his mistakes in Georgia and Ukraine.
While publicly welcoming Akaev to stay in Russia, he immediately accorded de
facto recognition to the interim regime : “These people are well - known to us.
Working in Kyrgyzstan bodes of power and administration over a number of
years, they have helped the development of relations between Kyrgyzstan and
the Russian Federation, and done a great deal to establish the current level of
intergovernmental relations. I hope that in the future our relations will be in the
same vector, i.e. positively [...] there is every reason for this [ as ] recent state-
ments by the leaders of the opposition confirm [...] I expect that this is how it will
be.”73
Putin had ample opportunity to size up the opposition and knew that he had
important leverage with any new leadership that emerged. By gracefully accept-
ing the new political dispensation, Putin realised that he had a chance of direct-
ing the new leadership. From the outset, Russia played a key role; when a ruffled
but defiant Akaev turned up in Moscow he refused to resign as president and
without his voluntary resignation the new leaders in Bishkek were faced with
something of a constitutional crisis.74 Before Akaev would relent, the opposition
had to send representatives to Moscow who, under the watchful eye of the
Kremlin, brokered a deal guaranteeing the deposed president’s interests.
Kyrgyzstan’s political elite was, contrary to Mikheil Saakashvili and his young
Turks, unmistakably Soviet in origin. Their political orientations had been
moulded by the Soviet regime and, in the absence of a velvet revolution in the
early 1990s, opposition tended to come from the national nomenklatura; the key
figures were certainly not dissidents like Lech Wałęsa or Vaclav Havel. This
quickly became clear during the coming weeks and months. Though the Kyrgyz
Supreme Court had annulled the elections on 24 March, the new leadership
decided to keep the new parliament for all its faults. This was despite the expec-
tation of the outgoing parliament and many opposition activists that free and fair
elections would be held to produce a legislature, the legitimacy of which would
be beyond reproach. By keeping the parliament that Akaev had sought to manu-
facture for his own ends, the new leadership avoided upsetting the incoming par-
liamentarians who had invested so much in winning their seats but, as so often
had been done in the past, traded stability for liberty. Far from being a child of
the revolution, the parliament was to be the same legislature that Akaev had con-
ceived and delivered.
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The democratic impulse was further suppressed when the two major con-
tenders for the presidency, Kurmanbek Bakiev and Felix Kulov, negotiated a
pact whereby they would divide the spoils between them; Bakiev would take the
presidency while Kulov would be Prime Minister. While presented by supporters
as a victory for democracy and inter - ethnic harmony ( Bakiev’s support base was
in the south whereas Kulov was strongest in the north ), the deal deprived the
electorate of a clear choice and made the subsequent presidential election in July
2005 more a coronation than a contest.
VI. Conclusion : Recipes for revolution 
Democratic impulses have been evident in every former Soviet republic, some,
of course, much weaker than others, but only Georgia and Ukraine have pro-
duced mass democratic movements that have managed to dislodge the incum-
bent regimes. If there is a recipe for revolution, we must not only attempt to iden-
tify the requisite ingredients but explain why the same ingredients when baked in
different national ovens do not produce the same results. 
Both Kuchma and Shevardnadze had come to power in the early 1990s,
replacing what they considered more nationalistic alternatives. Though present-
ing themselves as bulwarks against instability, the pragmatism without core val-
ues they practiced led to cynicism and apathy until mass electoral manipulation
finally tried the patience of large sections of the population. But despite the justi-
fiable blackening of their reputations by opposition critics, both Shevardnadze
and Kuchma presided over regimes that were relatively liberal and pluralistic
when compared with many other post - soviet regimes such as Belarus and
Uzbekistan. An independent media was allowed to develop; this was particularly
so in the print media but also to a lesser extent with television. Rustavi 2 in
Georgia and Channel 5 in Ukraine played an influential role in providing a sym-
pathetic platform for opposition viewpoints and even the state media was not as
obsequiously pro - government as in many other post - communist regimes. The
NGO sector had proliferated in Georgia and Ukraine. Civic movements had
been successful in both countries, and though often funded by foreign sources,
they had managed to develop a distinctive vision of politics and democratic life.
The attitude of the population had already changed over time, which is why it is
much more accurate to view the Rose and Orange revolutions as part of demo-
cratic processes not merely as isolated “events”.
Askar Akaev was also a leader whose political leanings were liberal by the
standards of the region and, though increasingly threatened, an independent
media and vibrant NGO sector did exist in Kyrgyzstan prior to March 2005. But
while the Tulip revolution may have had many of the ingredients of those in
Georgia and Ukraine it was half - baked. People rushed to action without having
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the conceptual ground paved; the result was minimal institutional change and
rapid popular disillusionment. Insufficient time had been available to build a
mass democratic movement and the accusation sometimes levied against the
Rose and Orange Revolutions, that what resulted merely was a circulation of
elites,75 carries more weight in the case of Kyrgyzstan. Cognisant of pressure
from powerful neighbours like Russia, China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and
the lukewarm support of distant democratic regimes, the post - Akaev govern-
ment in Bishkek did little to move Kyrgyzstan towards liberal democratic values.
Though the key beneficiaries of the Tulip Revolution may have been found want-
ing, there is reason to believe that civic activism is on the rise as witnessed by the
activities of the umbrella movement “For Reform” and the large demonstrations
throughout 2006 and 2007 to implement key democratic reforms indicate that
the departure of Akaev has not put most of the basic issues facing the Kyrgyz
people to rest.76
It is also important to acknowledge that there exists, in no small part thanks
to the revolutions, an international network of opposition movements, adept in
the tactics of peaceful protest and civil disobedience – and this may be a force to
reckon with in the future. Autocrats in other post - Soviet states view these net-
works as a “democratic Al Quaida”, working in highly organized cells, plotting
instability, and planning violent regime change. In this sense, they have decided
to completely overlook the peaceful nature of power transfer in Georgia and
Ukraine, preferring instead to maintain their increasingly shaky position of après
moi le deluge or, more appropriately perhaps, sans moi le deluge since the auto-
crats have made no provision for their retirement. 
It is erroneous to believe that initiatives that prove successful in one country
can be exported without difficulty to other states to achieve the same results; this
is reductive and ignores completely cultural and social factors particular to every
country. Rather than viewing the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions as an
unconstitutional action undertaken by manipulated mobs serving the interests of
those unhappy with the result of the election, it is more accurate to say that it was
the Governments of Georgia and Ukraine that first acted unconstitutionally by
rigging the elections. The opposition was then faced with a choice : either accept
the fruits of such unconstitutional actions, i.e. an illegitimate regime not repre-
sentative of the people’s wishes, or to follow the government into the unconstitu-
tional wilderness and to try and drag the political system back on to the constitu-
tional path by challenging the illegitimate results and demanding free and fair
elections.
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Since the revolutions, it has become fashionable in some circles to highlight
the inevitable gap between the expectations excited by the revolution and the
less glamorous reality that will remain for many years to come. Talk of wilting
roses and rotting oranges is facile, and often, though not exclusively, promoted
by those who were most against the revolution in the first place and are eager to
justify their instinctive distaste for the new leaderships. To dismiss the revolu-
tions in such a manner is to miss the point. The rose or orange victories were
important not so much in the result as in the process, which involved the mobi-
lization of large sections of the population to actively battle for democratic elec-
tions. Victory for Saakashvili or Yushchenko was but a first decisive step in what
will be a long journey. The fact that they did not reach their destination in a sin-
gle leap but instead merely took a step in the right direction should not be under-
estimated, particularly in regions where history has been largely a litany of steps
down long and winding cul de sacs.
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